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Computing with Moral Hazard
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Abstract—Recently, the concept of fog computing which aims
at providing time-sensitive data services has become popular.
In this model, computation is performed at the edge of the
network instead of sending vast amounts of data to the cloud.
Thus, fog computing provides low latency, location awareness
to end users, and improves quality-of-services (QoS). One
key feature in this model is the designing of payment plan
from network operator (NO) to fog nodes (FN) for the rental
of their computing resources, such as computation capacity,
spectrum, and transmission power. In this paper, we investigate
the problem of how to design the efficient payment plan to
maximize the NO’s revenue while maintaining FN’s incentive
to cooperate through the moral hazard model in contract theory.
We propose a multi-dimensional contract which considers the
FNs’ characteristics such as location, computation capacity,
storage, transmission bandwidth, and etc. First, a contract
which pays the FNs by evaluating the resources they have
provided from multiple aspects is proposed. Then, the utility
maximization problem of the NO is formulated. Furthermore,
we use the numerical results to analyze the optimal payment
plan, and compare the NO’s utility under different payment
plans.
Index Terms—Fog computing, contract theory, adverse selec-
tion, multi-dimension.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid developments of cloud computing have brought
a centralized solution to application developers and content
providers. Despite its wide known conveniences and advan-
tages, cloud computing also suffers from certain limitations
such as high latency and delay due to long distance between
end users and servers [1]. The emerging trends in net-
working such as large distributed sensor networks, industrial
automation, and high speed transportation that need location
dependent fast processing and cannot be satisfied by the
current service form by cloud computing [2].
With the motivation of placing the services as close as
possible to end users, researchers have proposed a new
cloud system called fog computing. In this model, fog nodes
(FNs) such as end-user devices, access points, edge routers
and switches are deployed at or very close to the edge of
network, and with functionalities like converged computing,
processing, management, networking, storage, physical and
cyber security [3]. Technically, fog computing is similar to
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Fig. 1: An illustration of fog computing system.
cloud computing in the sense that both are made up of virtual
systems providing the flexibility of on demand provisioning
of compute, storage and network resources. However, fog
computing has several advantages over cloud computing in
the sense of a significant reduction in data movement across
the network resulting in reduced congestion, cost and latency,
elimination of bottlenecks resulting from centralized comput-
ing systems, improved security of encrypted data as it stays
closer to the end user reducing exposure to hostile elements,
and improved scalability arising from virtualized systems
[4]. By opening the access to fog computing nodes, service
providers (SPs) can rapidly deploy certain applications and
services to improve the quality of service (QoS) toward end
users. This environment can also create a new value chain
comprising NOs, InPs, SPs, and end users.
Referring to one brief model of fog computing in Fig.
1, there are variety of end users from the areas such as
smart grid, industry, vehicular networks, transportation sys-
tem, public safety department, and etc. that require real-time
computing services. By subscribing to specific SPs whom
subscribed to the network operator (NO) to obtain access to
physical resources, end users are allowed to access computing
resources in both the fog and cloud, with fog close to end
users while cloud locates far away. Within this network, end
users directly communicate with FN for real-time control and
analytic, while the FNs only send periodic data summaries to
the cloud for further aggregation and procession. Usually, the
cloud and fog are managed by the NO, who rents the cloud
center and fog nodes from infrastructure providers (InPs).
The NO is aiming at maximize its revenue by efficiently
managing and coordinating the computing resources in both
fog and cloud. To fully utilize the fog computing with
minimal rent while ensuring the FNs receive non-negative
revenue, appropriate payment plan is needed to enable the
NO and FNs to play complementary roles within their
respective business models, and allow all players to benefit
from greater cooperation. Inspired by the effort-based reward
from the labor market where employers pays its employees
based on their work load, we propose a payment plan in
fog computing such that the FNs receive their rental in
accordance with the quantities of computing resources and
the quality of service (QoS) they provide to the NO. The
computing resources include the transmission bandwidth,
power, computation capability (CPU speed), storage size,
as well as a FN’s proximity towards end users. Meanwhile
the QoS can be referred to latency and delay during data
transmission and processing, as well as security [5].
Based on this motivation, we aim at offering a contract
that considers different aspects of the computing resources
provided by FNs to end users, and assigns different payment
weights in order to maximize the revenue of NO. Fortunately,
the moral hazard model from contract theory provides us a
useful tool to design such a payment plan that can solve
the NO’s revenue maximization problems in fog computing
when the FN’s performance in QoS is affected by multiple
aspects [6]. From the NO’s perspective, it “employs” the FNs
to perform computing tasks and offers them QoS consistent
payment by multi-dimension measurements. Inside this value
chain, the NO tries to guarantee the fog computing QoS with
minimal payment, while ensuring the FNs have necessary
incentives to cooperate. Thus, to maximize the NO’s revenue,
the NO needs to find an optimal payment plan that can
properly pay the infrastructure rent to FNs [7].
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows. First, we are first to propose a QoS consistent
contract which considers the quantities of resources provided
by FNs from multiple aspects. The contract characterizes the
general situation in real world and provides comprehensive
payment plan to the FNs for using of those resources. Second,
we formulate NO’s revenue maximization problem, as well
as provide the FNs with necessary incentive to cooperate
in fog computing. Third, through simulations, we reveal
different parameter’s impacts on the optimal payment plan,
and compare the NO utility under six different payment plans.
Our results show that by using the proposed payment plan,
the NO successfully maximizes the utilities and the FNs
obtain the continuous incentives to participate in the fog
computing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
we will introduce the network model in Section II. Then,
the problem formulation is described in Section III. The
performance evaluation is conducted in Section IV. Finally,
Section V draws the conclusion.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we consider a monopoly market with one
NO trading with one FN. The NO-FN mutual benefit model is
introduced first by constructing the multi-dimension payment
plan offered by the NO. Then, we will give the utility
functions of both the FN and NO before proceeding to the
solution of the optimal contract. We assume that the NO
considers n aspects of the computing resources provided by
Fig. 2: The multi-dimension resource quantity and QoS
consistent payment contract.
FN and will pay the rent based on the QoS from the different
aspects.
A. Operation Cost
In fog computing, the FN encounters both capital ex-
penditure (CapEx) and operational expenditure (OpEx) to
provide heterogeneous resources. CapEx is the prominent in-
vestment which includes the cost of purchasing and installing
equipments such as routers, switches, access points, backhaul
aggregators, as well as the cost of using licensed spectrum
issued by the authorities [8]. Meanwhile the OpEx includes
the energy consumption due to signal processing, execution,
and data transmission. We assume that the CapEx is fixed,
while the OpEx is usage based.
The FN’s heterogeneous resources are often measured
in disparate scales or units. It has been proved that those
measurements can be mapped into one single unit, such
as time [9]. Thus by mapping and normalization, we can
represent a FN’s contribution of resources such as bandwidth,
CPU, transmission power by a vector a = (a1, . . . , an),
n ≥ 1 for one computing task. After such mapping, each ai
has the same scale or unit and represents one resource type.
Such mapping is based on the knowledge that the bandwidth
and CPU speed affect the transmission and processing time,
respectively. Due to the context aware and location dependent
properties of fog computing, the size of data being processed
and the geographic distance between FN and end users also
have the impacts on data processing and transmission latency.
There are many other aspects that affect the QoS of fog com-
puting that we have not listed in Fig. 2, such as transmission
power, which can also be mapped to transmission latency.
When providing those resources, the FN’s cost incurred is
defined in a quadratic form,
ψ(a) =
1
2
aTCa, (1)
where C is a symmetric n× n matrix with the form of
C =


c11 · · · c1n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
cn1 · · · cnn

 . (2)
The diagonal element cii of C reflects the FNs resource-
specific cost coefficient, and the off-diagonal elements cij
represent the cost relationship between two resources i and
j.
The sign of cij indicates technologically substitute, com-
plementary, independent between two resources i and j,
if cij > 0, < 0, = 0, respectively. If two resources
are technologically substitute, raising the quantity of one
resource raises the marginal cost of the effort on the other
resources. The example of technologically substitute is the
relationship between geographic distance and transmission
power. To achieve the same data rate at the end user,
longer distance requires a higher transmission power con-
sumption. In contrast, raising the quantity on one resource
decreases the marginal cost of the other resource if they
are technologically complementary. One example is about
the relationship between bandwidth and transmission power.
Given the same data package size and transmission distance,
the larger bandwidth can achieve the same data rate at
receiver with lower transmission power. In this example, high
quality in one resource ease the cost in the other, and thus
called technologically complementary. For technologically
independent resources, their operation cost is not dependent
on the quantity of other resources. There are many techno-
logically independent examples in fog computing, such as
the relationships between transmission bandwidth and CPU
speed, geographic distance and data size.
In order to lower the mathematical complexity, we only
solve the cases without the technologically complementary
in this paper. Thus, the operation cost coefficient matrix is
a positive semi-definite matrix with every element in C is
non-negative.
B. QoS Measurement
The resources such as CPU speed, transmission bandwidth
and power can be easily specified by the FN, the end user
related parameters such as geographic distance, data size,
can also be quantified easily, while the measurement of QoS
cannot be that accurate. Though those measurements can be
mapped into time scale follow the procedure in [9], error may
come from the design failure of the measurement system.
Given the actual resources provided by FN is a, which
is hidden from the NO, but the FN’s QoS can be observed
as a vector of QoS q = (q1, . . . , qn), n ≥ 1, which can
be regarded as the FN’s performance in latency reduction.
Due to aforementioned different measurability on QoS, the
received information q varies. Therefore, the performance of
the FN is a noisy signal of the resources it has provided:
q = a+ ε, (3)
where the random component ε = (ε1, . . . , εn), n ≥ 1,
is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
covariance matrix Σ. Thus, the FN’s performance follows
the distribution of q ∼ N(a,Σ).
The variance Σ is a symmetric n × n covariance matrix
with the form of
Σ =


σ21 · · · σ1n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
σn1 · · · σ
2
n

 , (4)
where σ2i denotes the variance of εi, and σij is the covariance
of εi and εj . The variance denotes the difficulty to guarantee
the correctness of measuring the QoS, and also reflects the
resource quantity difference observed at the FN and NO
sides. If the variance is large, the measurability of the QoS
is difficult, and there is a high probability that the FN’s
performance is poorly measured and far away from the true
amount of resource the FN has provided. If the QoS is
easy to measure, the variance will be small or even zero.
For example, the data size is an independent measure with
variance 0, as well as the geographic distance. While the
data processing time not only depends on the data size,
but also the complexity of algorithm, which has a large
variance. The covariance of two measurements exists because
the measurement of one resource may affect the measurement
of the others; for example the transmission time is affected
by both bandwidth and power.
C. Payment Plan
Inspired by the manager’s reward package in industry,
which comprises a fixed salary, a bonus related to the firm’s
profits, and stock options related reward based on the firm’s
share price [10], we define the FN’s payment plan w in fog
computing as a linear combination of a fixed salary and QoS
related payments. By restricting the payment plan offered by
the NO in the linear form, the payment plan w FN receives
by participating in the fog computing can be written as
w = t+ sT q, (5)
where t denotes the fixed salary, which is a constant in-
dependent of QoS and regarded as the subscribing fee to
complement the FN’s CapEx. s = (s1, . . . , sn), n ≥ 1
is the payment related to the QoS q. As q is a random
variable which follows q ∼ N(a,Σ), the payment plan
w is also a random variable with a mean of t + sTa.
From the scaling property of covariance, we know that
V ar(sT q) = sTΣs. Thus, the payment plan follows the
distribution w ∼ N(t+ sTa, sTΣs).
At this point, we can propose the contract that is offered
by the NO as (a, t, s), where a and s are n× 1 vectors, and
t is a constant value. Under this contract, the NO offers the
FN a payment plan which includes a fixed salary t, and n
QoS related payments (s1, . . . , sn). Fig. 2 illustrates how this
contract works. The FN provides the quantity ai for resource
i in the computing task, which is observed as a QoS qi by
the NO. The NO then offers a payment si related to qi.
D. Utility of Fog Node
In this model, we assume that the FN has constant absolute
risk averse (CARA) risk preferences, which means the FN
has a constant attitude towards risk as its income increases.
Such a risk preference comes from the FN’s concern about its
security issue when opening access for end users. Thus, FN
utility is represented by a negative exponential utility form
[11],
u(a, t, s) = −e−η[w−ψ(a)], (6)
where η > 0 is the FN’s degree of absolute risk aversion
η = −
u′′
u′
, (7)
where u is the FN’s utility function. A larger value of η means
more incentive for the FN to provide more resources for the
computing task. The utility and operation cost of the FN are
measured in such monetary units that they are consistent with
the payment from the NO.
From (6), we see that the FN’s utility is a strictly increasing
and concave function. For lower computation complexity, we
can make use of the exponential form of the utility function,
and use certainty equivalent as a monotonic transformation
of the FN’s expected exponential utility function [12].
Proposition 1. The FN’s utility can be equally represented
by certainty equivalent:
CEu = t+ s
T a−
1
2
aTCa−
1
2
ηsTΣs. (8)
The certainty equivalent consists of the expected payment
minus the operation cost and measurement cost.
E. Utility of Network Operator
Here, we define the utility of the NO as the expected gross
benefits of V (a) minus the payment plan w to the FN. Thus,
the NO’s expected utility is written as
U(a, t, s) = V (a)− w, (9)
where V (·) is the evaluation function which follows V (0) =
0 and V ′(·) > 0. Different from the FN who has CARA
risk preferences, the NO here is assumed to be risk neutral,
i.e., V ′′(·) = 0. Thus, the expected profit of the NO can be
simplified to
U(a, t, s) = βT a− w, (10)
where β = (β1, . . . , βn), n ≥ 1, characterizes the marginal
effect of the FN’s contribution a on the NO’s utility V (a).
Similar to the definition of FN’s certainty equivalent, we can
derive the NO’s certainty equivalent as
CEp = E[β
Ta− w], (11)
= βTa− sTa− t.
F. Social Welfare
With the definitions of both FN’s and NO’s utility func-
tions and certainty equivalent payoffs, we can have the social
welfare defined as their joint surplus, i.e., the summation of
FN’s and NO’s equivalent certainty:
R = CEu + CEp, (12)
= βT a−
1
2
aTCa−
1
2
ηsTΣs.
The social welfare is the resource provided by the FN,
minus the operation cost and the cost incurred by inaccurate
measurement. Notice that this expression is independent of
the fixed salary t, which serves as an intercept term in the
contract. Thus, the fixed salary t can only be used to allocate
the total certainty equivalent between the two parties [13].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
With the system model, we can formulate the NO’s utility
maximization problem while providing the FN necessary
incentives to cooperate. The NO’s problem can be written
as
max
a,t,s
U(a∗, t, s), (13)
s.t. (a) a∗ ∈ argmax
a
u(a, t, s),
(b) u(a∗, t, s) ≥ u(w),
where u(w) is the reservation utility of the FN when not
providing any resource (a = 0) in the fog computing. The
NO maximize its own utility under the incentive compatible
(IC) constraint (a) that the FN provides the optimal amount
of resource a∗ maximizing its own utility, and the individual
rationality (IR) constraint (b) that the utility FN received is
no less than its reservation utility.
Under the assumption of stochastic dependent, the er-
ror terms are stochastically interacted, i.e., σij 6= 0. For
technologically dependent, we mean that the activities are
technologically correlated with each other, i.e., cij > 0
and C is a positive definite matrix. We solve this multi-
dimensional problem by using certainty equivalent model
with the following simple reformulation of the NO’s problem:
max
a,t,s
βT a− sTa− t, (14)
s.t. (a) a∗ ∈ argmax
a
[t+ sTa−
1
2
aTCa−
1
2
ηsTΣs],
(b) t+ sTa−
1
2
aTCa−
1
2
ηsTΣs ≥ w,
where w also denotes the reservation utility of the FN when
not participating in the fog computing. The IC constraint
represents the rationality of the FNs choice of contribution.
The IR constraint in (b) ensures that the NO cannot force the
FN into accepting the contract.
We first solve the optimal effort by reducing the IC
constraint first. The FN’s certainty equivalent is concave,
since its second-order derivative with respect to a is a
negative definite matrix −C. Thus, the optimal effort can
be determined by taking the first-order derivative of the FN’s
certainty equivalent regarding a, and set u′(a, t, s) = 0. In
the matrix differentiation, if we define α = aTCa, as C is
a symmetric matrix, we have ∂α/∂a = 2aTC [14]. Since C
is symmetric positive definite, its inverse is existent. Thus,
through numerical derivations, we finally have a = C−1s in
this multi-dimension case. Accordingly, we substitute the IR
constraint in (b) with the optimal amount of resource a∗ and
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Fig. 3: The NO’s utility as different parameters vary
simplify the NO’s problem to
max
a,t,s
βTC−1s− sTC−1s− t, (15)
s.t. (a) t+ sTC−1s−
1
2
(C−1s)TC(C−1s)
−
1
2
ηsTΣs = w.
Substituting the value of t in the IR constraint to the objective
and differentiating the objective function with respect to s,
we have the QoS related payment s∗ in the optimal multi-
dimension payment plan as:
s∗ = (C−1 + ηΣ)−1C−1β = (I + ηCΣ)−1β. (16)
With s∗, we have the optimal amount of computing resource
in the multi resource case as
a∗ = C−1(I + ηCΣ)−1β. (17)
Representing t by w, s∗ and a∗, we obtain the fixed payment
t in the optimal linear payment plan as:
t∗ = w +
1
2
sT (ηΣ− C−1)s, (18)
= w +
1
2
[
(I + ηCΣ)−1β
]T
(ηΣ− C−1)
[
(I + ηCΣ)−1β
]
.
Using the s∗ in (16), we can indeed determine how
the optimal payment plan varies with the accuracy of QoS
measures for each resource and the operation cost coefficient
of each resource. For example, when two resources are
technologically substitution cij > 0, if the measurability of
resource i worsens, that is, σ2i increases, then, as is intuitive,
s∗j goes up, but s∗i goes down. Thus, there is a measurement
complementarity between the s∗i and s∗j in the presence of
technologically substitutes problems [6].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we will first give a detailed analysis of
how the NO’s utility changes by varying the parameters
such as the operation cost coefficients and measurement error
covariance. Meanwhile, we will conduct a comparison of
the NO’s utility among different payment plans. To set up
the simulation, we assume that, the reservation payment of
the FN w = 0 when not cooperating in the fog computing
(a = 0). The reason we do not consider the FN’s utility is
that, from the optimal payment plan we have derived, no
matter how those parameters change, the FN’s utility will
remain the same. The optimal payment plan will bring FN
the utility the same as the reservation utility −e−ηw, which
in our case is −1 as we set w = 0.
In the previous section, we have solved the optimal
payment plan when the measurement errors are stochastic
dependent and the resource types are technologically de-
pendent. As this multi-dimension case is the most general
case in reality, we name this mechanism by General. For
comparison, we propose 5 more payment plans. The fist one
is the optimal payment plan when the measurement error
and resource type are independent, and thus we name it
by Independent. The second payment plan is called Single
Bonus that is the payment plan obtained in the one-dimension
case. In this one-dimension case, we can regard the NO
payments FN on the QoS of a single one resource type.
For example, measuring the data processing latency by only
taking the CPU speed into account. The third and forth
ones are special cases of the General: one is stochastic
independent but technologically dependent, the other one is
technologically independent but stochastic dependent, and
are named by Stochastic Independent and Technologically
Independent, respectively. The last one is called Opening
Reward, which is the payment plan only contains a fixed
salary t. We can regard this mechanism as the NO offers the
FN a one time payment at subscription. But this Opening
Reward mechanism does not care about FN’s future service
quality.
In Fig. 3a, we compare the NO’s utility from the six
payment plans as we vary the resource-specific operation
cost coefficient cii. From the simulation results we see that,
as the cost coefficient cii increases, the NO’s utility is
decreasing in contrast. The reason for this phenomenon is that
larger cost coefficient cii means more operation cost when
providing such an resource. Therefore, the FN is less likely
to contribute in the fog computing. With less computing
resources provided by the FN, the QoS will decrease and
the NO’s utility will certainly decrease. In addition, from
Fig. 3a, we see that the NO obtains the largest utility in
the Opening Reward case. Followed by the Independent,
Stochastic Independent, and Technologically Independent, the
General case proposed by us brings the fifth highest utility
to the NO, while the Single Bonus gives the least utility.
In Fig. 3b, we analyze the impact of FN’s risk averse
degree η on the NO’s utility. As the NO’s utility V = a−t in
the Opening Reward is independent of the risk averse degree
η, we cannot see any change in the NO’s utility. For the
other five payment plans, we see that the NO’s utility is
decreasing as the FN’s risk averse degree η increases. This
result is intuitive as a larger η means the FN becomes more
conservative and sensitive to risk, thus less likely to open
access to end users. With less resources obtained from the
FN, the NO’s utility will certainly decrease. From Fig. 3b
we also obtains the similar ranking of the NO’s utility as
in the previous figure: the Independent case brings higher
utility than the Stochastic Independent, Technologically Inde-
pendent, and General one, and the Single Bonus one brings
the smallest utility for the NO.
In Fig. 3c, we increase the variance σ2i to see how the
NO’s utility varies. Similar to the previous case, the NO’s
utility V = a − t in the Opening Reward is independent
of the covariance matrix. Thus, we cannot see any change
of the NO’s utility. For the other payment plans, the NO’s
utility is decreasing with the variance, which is in accordance
with our conclusion in the previous section. The variance
σ2i of measurement error denotes the relationship between
the resources provided by the FN and the QoS observed by
the NO. As σ2i increases, it indicates a weaker relationship
between resource quantity and the expected QoS achieved.
As a result, the FN is likely to provide less amount of
resource with increases in uncertainty, and thus a lower cost
of cooperation. With the decrease of computing resources, the
QoS is lowered and the NO’s utility will certainly decrease.
From Fig. 3c we also obtain the similar ranking of the
NO’s utility as in the previous figure: the Independent case
brings higher utility than Stochastic Independent, followed
by Technologically Independent and General one, the Single
Bonus one brings the lowest utility for the NO.
The reason for the quality ranking of the six payment plans
in Fig. 3a, Fig. 3b, and Fig. 3c is as follows. The Indepen-
dent payment plan is the ideal case of the General multi-
dimension case. As less measurement cost is occurred when
predicting the QoS and less operation cost is encountered due
to technology substitution, a higher utility is obtained than
the other payment plans. The Stochastic Independent and
Technologically Independent are partial independent cases
of the General multi-dimension one, thus, the NO’s utility
lies between the Independent and General. But as we have
assigned larger values for the covariance matrix of the the
measurement error than the operation cost coefficient matrix,
more computing resources will be provided in the Stochastic
Independent than in the Technologically Independent. There-
fore, the NO’s utility is higher in the Stochastic Independent
than in the Technologically Independent case, while the Sin-
gle Bonus only payment FN with only one type of resource
evaluation. As a result, the FNs have less incentive to provide
computing resources. In return, less utility is obtained by the
NO. For the result of the Opening Reward case, it seems
unreasonable at the first sight, as it brings the NO the highest
utility than the other payment plans. While we notice that
Opening Payment is a “once-for-all” deal which does not
provide continuous incentives for the FNs, i.e., after the FN
has finished the computing task and receive the payment, it
is likely to stop cooperating in the future.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of maxi-
mizing NO’s revenue by efficiently allocating FNs’ computa-
tion resources in fog computing. The optimal payment plan is
solved by paying the rent of FN’s computing resources from
a multi-dimension evaluation while ensuring the FN’s coop-
eration. Furthermore, we use the numerical results to analyze
the optimal payment plan by varying different parameters. In
addition, we compare the NOs’ utility under the six different
payment plans, and show that the NO’s utility deteriorates
with large operation cost coefficient, higher risk aversion of
FNs, and large measurement error variance.
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